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Abstract
In the past few years, Internet miscreants have
developed a number of techniques to defraud and
make a hefty profit out of their unsuspecting victims.
A troubling, recent example of this trend is cyber-
criminals distributing rogue security software, that is
malicious programs that, by pretending to be legitimate
security tools (e.g., anti-virus or anti-spyware), deceive
users into paying a substantial amount of money in
exchange for little or no protection.
While the technical and economical aspects of rogue
security software (e.g., its distribution and monetiza-
tion mechanisms) are relatively well-understood, much
less is known about the campaigns through which this
type of malware is distributed, that is what are the un-
derlying techniques and coordinated efforts employed
by cyber-criminals to spread their malware.
In this paper, we present the techniques we used
to analyze rogue security software campaigns, with
an emphasis on the infrastructure employed in the
campaign and the life-cycle of the clients that they
infect.
1. Introduction
A rogue security software program is a type of
misleading application that pretends to be legitimate
security software, such as an anti-virus scanner, but
which actually provides the user with little or no
protection. In some cases, rogue security software
(in the following, more compactly rogue AV) actually
facilitates the installation of the very malicious code
that it purports to protect against.
Rogue AV makes its way on victim machines in two
prevalent ways. First, social engineering techniques
can be used to convince unexperienced users that a
rogue tool is legitimate and that its use is necessary to
remediate often inexistent or exaggerated threats found
on the victim’s computer. A second, more stealthy
technique consists of attracting victims on malicious
web sites that exploit vulnerabilities in the client
software (typically, the browser or one of its plugins)
to download and install the rogue programs without
any user intervention.
Rogue AV programs are distributed by cyber-
criminals to generate a financial profit. In fact, after
the initial infection, victims are typically tricked into
paying for additional tools or services (e.g., to upgrade
to the full version of the program or to subscribe to an
update mechanism), which are most often fictitious or
completely ineffective. The cost of these scams range
from $30–$100.
Despite its reliance on traditional and relatively
unsophisticated techniques, rogue AV has emerged as
a major security threat, in terms of the size of the
affected population (Symantec’s sensors alone reported
43 million installation attempts over a one-year pe-
riod [1]), the number of different variants unleashed
in-the-wild (over 250 distinct families of rogue tools
have been classified [1]), and the volume of profits
generated for cyber-criminals (upward of $300,000 a
month in affiliate commissions alone [2]).
The prevalence and effectiveness of this threat has
spurred considerable research by the security commu-
nity [1], [3], [4]. These studies have led to a better
understanding of the technical characteristics of this
malware (e.g., its advertising and installation tech-
niques) and of the quantitative aspects of the overall
threat (e.g., the number and geolocation of the web
sites involved in the distribution of rogue programs
and of their victims).
However, a number of areas have not been fully ex-
plored. In particular, malware code, the infrastructure
used to distribute it, and the victims that encounter
it do not exist in isolation, but are different aspects
of the coordinated effort by cyber-criminals to spread
rogue AV. We refer to such a coordinated activity as
a campaign. In our work, rather than examining or
measuring single aspects of a rogue AV campaign,
we analyzed the campaign as a whole, focusing, in
particular, on understanding its infrastructure (e.g., the
web servers, DNS servers, and web sites it uses) and
the way it is created and managed; and on how it
affects the clients that interact with it. More precisely,
the main contributions of our work are:
• We developed a methodology to identify the
server components used in a rogue security soft-
ware campaign and to learn any emerging patterns
in the ways these are set up and organized.
• We leveraged the results of our analysis to provide
insights into the tools, techniques, and strategies
followed by current campaigns.
• Finally, we have performed an initial analysis of
the behavior and life-cycle of infected clients, as
observed from within the infrastructure respon-
sible for the infection (as opposed to the client
end-point).
2. Our Approach
Server-side analysis. A primary goal of our analysis
is to identify the server-side components involved in
a campaign. While extensive lists of individual rogue
AV-hosting sites are easily obtainable from telemetry
data of legitimate anti-virus tools or publicly-available
blacklists, this data per se does not provide information
on the campaigns themselves, for example, whether
two sites are part of the same campaign.
One assumption that can reasonably be made is that
a campaign is managed by a group of people, who are
likely to reuse, at various stages of the campaign, the
same techniques, strategies, and tools. Consequently,
our approach to studying the infrastructure of rogue
AV campaigns (e.g., rogue AV-hosting sites, DNS
servers) is based on identifying commonalities in the
sites employed in the campaigns. More precisely, we
apply multi-criteria clustering to determine groupings
of server components with similar characteristics (the
interested reader can refer to [5] for the details of
our clustering techniques). The features we used for
the clustering consisted of a number of “network
observables” including IP address(es), DNS names,
other DNS entries pointing to the same IP, geolocation
information, server identification string and version
number, ISP identity, AS number, DNS registrar, DNS
registrant, and server uptime. Values for each of these
features were collected over a period of approximately
two months. The rogue AV-hosting servers that we an-
alyzed using these techniques were identified through
a variety of means, including automated and manual
feeds. In total, we considered 4,305 rogue AV-hosting
IP addresses with 6,500 related domain names.
Our analysis identified 39 distinct clusters compris-
ing 10 or more domains, which we interpret as different
campaigns. Figure 1 shows one such cluster, which
comprises 15 distinct rogue AV-hosting sites (blue
nodes). A number of details support the hypothesis that
these sites are indeed part of the same campaign. First,
registration data shows that all sites were registered
on the same day using only 3 email addresses from
.ru domains (red nodes). Second, all sites have been
hosted at one point in time in the same AS, even more
strikingly on consecutive IP addresses (yellow nodes).
Furthermore, the site names follow the same nam-
ing scheme, which consists of different combinations
of basic tokens such as home, av, anti-virus.
Finally, even more conclusively, we found that the
content of each site was identical (notice that the site
content is not a feature of our clustering system).
Other clusters represent more sophisticated cam-
paigns. For example, our analysis isolated a cluster (not
discussed here in detail for sake of space) describing
a campaign involving 750 web sites, registered over a
period of 8 months, and hosted in several distinct ASes
and countries.
Client-side analysis. During our study we found that
6 of the rogue AV-hosting servers we monitored were
leaking information about the clients accessing them
and their requests. The data available to us during
this monitoring was limited to the access time, the
IP address of the client, and the specific URL on
the server that was accessed. In particular, we did
not have access to the content of the client-server
communication, for example, we could not be certain
whether client requests were successful or not. Despite
these limitations, this data provides an interesting view
of the (potential and actual) victims of a campaign, as
seen from inside the rogue AV infrastructure. We report
here some of the results from our 45-day monitoring,
during which we observed 372,096 distinct client IP
addresses.
Rogue AV victims can issue several different types
of requests, depending on their current stage in the
infection. For example, scan requests cause a fake
scan of the victim’s computer to be displayed. These
requests are typical of the before-the-infection phase,
when the victim should be scared into downloading
and installing the rogue AV. Other requests are related
to the installation and use of the rogue AV: download
requests retrieve the actual binary, update requests
check if new versions of the rogue AV or of its (per-
functory) virus definitions are available. Other classes
of requests we observed include accesses to pages that
present a payment form (where victims pay for the





























































Figure 2. Duration of client interactions (by /24 sub-
net).
report requests relay to the server various events (e.g.,
a successful installation).
Most of the clients interacted with any of the servers
we monitored only for a few days. More precisely, we
noticed that less than 10% of the clients connected to
one of the servers 15 days after their first visit (for this
measurement, we identify a client by its /24 subnet
address to offset DHCP and NAT effects). This is a
surprising result as some of the request types described
above (e.g., the update requests) would suggest long-
lasting interactions. We speculate that this may indicate
that the majority of clients do not fall for the scare
techniques (thus avoiding the infection) or are quick at
removing a rogue AV after it is installed. Alternatively,
this result may be an artifact of our limited visibility
of client requests, if, for example, clients successfully
infected by rogue AV communicated with a different
set of servers.
3. Conclusions
We analyzed rogue AV campaigns by analyzing
server-side and client-side data. Our clustering tech-
nique used various server features to identify 39 cam-
paigns out of 6,500 involved sites. These results can
be leveraged in several ways. First, they give a more
explanatory description of the rogue AV threat, in
which, for example, individual, disconnected sites are
substituted by sets of related sites and time relation-
ships (e.g., dates of domain registrations) are explicit.
Second, campaign-level information reveals the modus
operandi of the criminals orchestrating the campaign,
for example, their registration and hosting partners, the
duration of their efforts, the sophistication of the tools
available to them (e.g., to automate the registration of
domain names), and the countermeasures they employ
against take-down efforts (e.g., moving web sites from
one IP address to a different, fresh one). Finally, the
patterns discovered by our clustering analysis could
yield means for identifying additional rogue AV sites
proactively or reactively. Analysis of client-side data
shed some light into the life-cycle of potential and
actual victims of rogue AV and their interactions with
rogue AV sites. The results of these analysis may be
used to derive models of the network traffic of infected
machines or to estimate the resilience of rogue AV to
cleanup efforts.
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